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Domestic Relations-Divorce Law Changes
I Introduction
On April 1, 1969, the divorce, annulment and separate maintenance law, of West Virginia was partially rewritten and formally
enacted by the Legislature. Aside from minor technical changes,
major substantive modifications also were included in the enactment.
The revisors of the domestic relation statutes deleted the
2
restriction on interracial marriage between whites and Negroes
and lifted a similar prohibition against the marriage of an epileptic8
A 1967 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Loving v.
Virginia4 ruling Virginia's antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional, seems to have presaged the eradication of the racial restriction
in the marriage law of West Virginia.5 The lifting of the ban on the
marriage of epileptics appears to have been the result of the legislature's awareness of modern medicine6

'W. VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 2 (Michie Supp. 1969). This comment will be
limited to the substantive changes to the divorce law enacted by the regular
session of the 1969 West Virginia Legislature. It will not include discussion of
possible procedural conflicts with the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
'W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1969). Under former W. VA.
CODE ch. 48, art. 2 § 1 (Michie 1966), all marriages between a white person
and a Negro were void from the time they were so declared by a decree of
nullity.
'W. VA. CODz ch. 48, art. 2, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1969).
'388 U.S. 1, rev'g 206 Va. 824, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1967). In this landmark case,
the United States Supreme Court rendered inoperable the antimiscegenation
statutes of fifteen states, most of them in the South and including West Virginia. The Court, although recognizing the power of a state to establish marriage classifications to accomplish legitimate purposes, held that Virginia's
antimiscegenaton statute was an unreasonable racial classification and therefore
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the equal protection and
due process causes of the fourteenth amendment.
'See generally Colson, Twenty Years of West Virginia Marriage and Divorce
Law, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 128 (1955). Dean Colson stated:
"[T]he West Virginia statutes prohibiting marriages between white
persons and negroes [SIC] and providing for the annulment of such
marriages are to say the least of doubtful constitutionality." Id. at 130.
'With the information available to medical authorities during the 1800's,
it is possibly understandable that epileptics were forbidden to marry and states
were within their police powers to enact such laws for the health and safety
of their citizens. However, medical science has since departed its primitive
state in this area and continued bans on the marriage of epileptics are untenable.
See generally R. ALLEN E. FEsm,
LEGAL INCOMPErENCY

H.

(1968); R. BAMsOW

WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND
AND H. FABRING, EPILEPSY AND THE

LAw (1956).
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II

Alimony for Male Spouse

The revision in the divorce law affords the male spouse the
right to seek alimony from the female spouse.7 Under the prior
statute only the wife was entitled to sue for alimony. That view was
consistent with case law which held the husband responsible for
the support of his wife,8 even after termination of the marriage.9
With respect to alimony, the common law did not impose a duty
on the wife to support her husband during the marriage,10 much less
after its dissolution. 1 An obligation on the wife to support her
husband during or after marriage, therefore, may only rest by
statute."¢ In addition to becoming eligible for receipt of alimony,
the husband is now eligible to receive separate maintenance
pendente lite from his wife.13 This provision appears to serve the
practical purpose of assuring access to joint assets to either spouse in
the event that the other maintains complete control over such
assets. However, a curious omission in the legislative revisions with
respect to alimony and separate maintenance is that the husband
was not afforded the equal opportunity to receive separate maintenance from the wife." If the Legislature saw fit to give the male
spouse the right to alimony and separate maintenance pendente lite,
then why did the Legislature not also extend to the male an equal
right to separate maintenance? The legislative revisions appear inconsistent in that respect.
TW. VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 2, § § 15, 16 (Michie Supp. 1969). Section 15
states that "[u]pon ordering a divorce the court may make such further order
as it shall deem expedient, concerning the maintenance of the parties, or
either of them .... ." (emphasis added). Section 16 states that in determining
the amount of alimony the court "shall take into consideration . .. the financial needs of the parties, the earnings and earning ability of the husband and
wife .... ." (emphasis added).
'See Brady v. Brady, 151 W. Va. 900, 158 S.F.2d 359 (1967); In re Estate
of Nicholas, 144 W. Va. 116, 94 S.E.2d 452 (1959); Snyder v. Lane, 141 W. Va.
195, 65 S.E.2d 483 (1944); Hinton Dep't Co. v. Lilly, 105 W. Va. 126, 141
S.E.2d 629 (1928).
'See State v. Knapp, 143 W.Va. 896, 105 S.E. 2d 569 (1958>; Games v. Games,
111 W.Va. 327, 161 S.F. 560 (1931); Burdette v. Burdette, 109 W.Va. 95, 158
S.E. 150 (1930).
"See In re Garrison, 171 Misc. 983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Colum. Co. Ct. 1939);
Hodson v. Stapleton, 248 App. Div. 524, 290 N.Y.S. 570 (1936); Apostle v.
Pappas, 154 Misc. 497, 277 N.Y.S. 400 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
"See Lawering v. Lawering, 21 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Bartunek v.

Bartunek, 109 Neb. 437, 191 N.W. 671 (1922); Bristol v. Bristol, 107 Neb. 321,
185 N.W.
972 (1921); Clouse v. Clouse, 185 Tenn. 666, 207 S.W.2d 576 (1948).
2
See Hopkins v. Detrick, 97 Cal. App. 2d 50, 217 P.2d 78 (1950); Hartnett
v. Hartnett, 93 N.H. 406, 43 A. 2d 153 (1945); Bennett v. Bennett, 208 Ore.
524, 302 P.2d 1019 (1956); Hedderick v. Hedderick, 163 Pa. Super. 564, 63

A.2d 373 (1949).

'1 W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 13 (Michie Supp. 1969).
2
W. VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 2, § 28 (Michie Supp. 1969).
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New Grounds for Divorce

The state Legislature liberalized the divorce law by creating
new grounds for divorce. The Legislature provided that "[w]here
the parties have lived separate and apart in separate places of abode
without cohabitation and without interruption for two years,
whether such separation was the voluntary act of one of the parties
or by the mutual consent of the parties 5 . . ." a divorce may be

granted. In Glendening v. Glendening,8 the court held that the
purpose of the "separate and apart" ground for divorce is to permit
termination in law of marriages which have ceased to exist in fact.
In adopting this new ground for divorce, however, the Legislature failed to express whether the law is to act retrospectively.
That is, whether the law will recognize time that couples have lived
separate and apart prior to the enactment of the statute for the
purpose of fulfilling the two-year separation requirement.
It has been stated that "(t]here can be no doubt that the legislature possesses the power to enact retrospective legislation."" With
respect to divorce laws, courts generally have held that statutes
broadening grounds for divorce are not limited to prospective operation but operate retrospectively as well.' s However, there is
some authority to the effect that a statute creating new grounds for
divorce cannot be applied retrospectively. 19 The courts in the majority of these cases appear to have based their findings on the
contention that if the respective legislatures had intended a retrospective application, that intent would have been clearly manifest,'W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 4 (Michie Supp. 1969). The Legislature
also provided that a plea of recrimination or res adjudicata will not be a
bar to a divorce under this section. Id.
It should also be noted that restrictions against the remarriage of the
parties were removed by the deletion of a former statute, W. VA. CODE ch.
48, art. 2, § 22 (Michie 1966), from the new enactment. This provision placed
a sixty day restriction on any remarriage of the parties, unless to each other,
and gave the court discretion to prohibit the guilty party from remarrying
anyone other than the former spouse up to one year.
T 06 A.2d 824 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965).
'Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 336, 10 S.E. 2d 893, 896 (1940).
See, e.g., Sills v. Sills, 246 Ala. 165, 19 So. 2d 521 (1944); Dodrer v. Dodrer,
183 Md. 413, 87 A. 2d 919 (1944); Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 299, 198 A.
414 (1938); Schacht v. Schacht, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1969); Packer v. Packer,
55 Misc.2d 74, 284 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1967); McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d
913 (rex. Civ. App. 1956); Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825
(1965);
Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
"9See, e.g., Barringer v. Barringer, 200 Ala. 315, 70 So. 81 (1917); Sherburne
v. Sherburne, 6 Me. 210 (1829); Burt v. Burt, 168 Mass. 204, 46 N.E. 622
(1897); Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 N.H. 200 (1841); Pierce v. Pierce, 107 Wash.
125, 181 P. 24 (1919).
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edY. Another argument against retrospective application centers
around the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws. Article 1,
section 10 of the United States Constitution expressly forbids any
state from passing an ex post facto law. However, it can be argued
that since an ex post facto law relates to those laws criminal in
nature, no application may be extended to divorce proceedings
which are merely civil in nature.22 A retrospective divorce law may
therefore be, in a sense, an ex post facto law but still comply with
due process requirements2 3 and not fall within the ambit of constitutional restrictions.24
The West Virginia statute in question is very similar to the
statute enacted by Virginia.25 Whether or not the Virginia statute
operated retroactively was decided by the Virginia Supreme Court
20
of Appeals in 1965. In Hagen v. Hagen,
the court held that although the language of the statuteF does not expressly state that
it is to operate retroactively, it is unnecessary "that the statute so
state."28
The court further stated that "[t]his language dearly indicates that it is to apply to the past as well as to the future."29 Likewise, a New York court, rendering its interpretation of a similar
statute, held for a retrospective interpretation because "[a] literal,
unstrained reading of [the statute] so indicates." 0
Provided the particular factual situation does not involve
an impairment of obligations of contracts nor problems relating
to vested property rights, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals when presented with the question of the retrospective application of the separation statute, may well follow the weight of authority3 and rule in the affirmative.
The Legislature provided an additional new ground for divorce
when a spouse is permanently and incurably insane and has been
confined in a mental hospital "for three consecutive years next
preceding the filing of the complaint."32 The statute provides that
2'See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 107 Wash. 125, 181 P. 24 (1919).
'See Schacht v. Schacht, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1969).
'Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 181, 29 A.2d 287, 289 (1942); Garret
Freight Lines v. State Tax Comn'r, 102 Utah 390, 397, 135 P.2d 523, 527 (1943).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
"'Bay v. Gage, 36 N.Y. (Barb.) 447 (1862).
"VA. CODE, § 20-91 (9) (Michie Supp. 1968).
"205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
"VA. CODE, § 20-91 (9) (Michie Supp. 1968).
'Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 796, 139 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1965).
fId. at 796, 139 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1965).
"Schacht v. Schacht, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (1969).
'Cases cited note 19 supra.
"W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 4(8) (Michie Supp. 1969).
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the court granting the divorce may, at its discretion, order support
and maintenance paid for the benefit of the permanently and incurably insane person.33
IV Divisible Divorce Doctrine
In rewriting the divorce law, the Legislature provided revisions
consistent with the majority of American jurisdictions. In one respect, however, the Legislature failed to adopt an arguably sound
and just view-the divisible divorce doctrine.3 4 In essence, the
divisible divorce doctrine states that a foreign ex parte divorce does
not nullify existing separate maintenance awards nor preclude an
alimony suit by the other party. West Virginia does not recognize
this doctrine;35 instead a foreign ex parte divorce decree is considered as superseding existing separate maintenance decrees and precluding a subsequent suit for alimony by the divorced spouse. This
point of view revolves around two primary rationales. Initially, West
Virginia honors the foreign ex parte decree pursuant to the full
faith and credit clause-, and will comply with it.37 Secondly, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in recognizing the absolute
divorce decree from another state, holds that the dissolution of
marital status terminates the right of the wife to alimony unless provision for same was made in the foreign ex parte action. In other
words, divorce and the settlement of alimony are viewed as indivisible, and West Virginia courts have seen no reason to split the cause
of action.
There is, however, good reason to urge adoption of the divisible divorce doctrine. A primary reason is that insistence by the
court on the indivisibility of divorce and alimony is giving full faith
and credit to in rem foreign ex parte divorce actions at the expense
of the in personam rights of the spouse to alimony. Judge Calhoun
stated in his dissent in Brady v. Brady38 that "[t]Ihe mere jurisdiction of the res, of the marital status, [gives] no jurisdiction to

:This maintenance provision can be construed as a companion provision
to W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966) which provides for the
maintenance of mentally ill persons in state hospitals and the right of reimbursement to the hospital from relatives of the patient for the maintenance

of said patients.
'See generally, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 198 (1955).
'Brady v. Brady, 151 W. Va. 900, 158 S.E.2d 359 (1967).
"U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
'W.
VA. CoDE ch. 57, art. 1, § 12 (Michie 1966).
'Brady v. Brady, 151 W. Va. 900, 914 158 S.E. 2d 359, 867 (1967).
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[foreign] courts to interfere with, to modify or to nullify the in
personam rights of the wife .

. ."39

Justice Douglas, speaking for

the Supreme Court in Estin v. Estin4o stated that "[a] judgment
of a court having no jurisdiction to render it is not entitled to the
full faith and credit which the Constitution and statutes of the
United States demand." 41 The wife's right to alimony is an
intangible property interest in which she has personal rights and
which is not subject to adjudication in ex parte proceedings.42 Giving full faith and credit to a foreign state's ex parte proceeding
which affects a wife's interest in alimony would seem to be contrary
to a sound sense of justice. In other words, the spouse may be
arbitrarily excluded from receiving alimony on the basis of a
questionable doctrine, and the Legislature failed to respond
to a present inequity in our divorce laws in its failure to deal with
the issue of the divisible divorce doctrine.
David L. Parmer

'Id. at 914, 158 S.E2d at 367.
40334 U.S. 541 (1948); cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957);
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1955); Krieger v. Krieger, 384 U.S.
555 (1948) ; Bassett v. Bassett, 141 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1944).
'Estin v. Estin, 34 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
' Meredith v. Meredith, 226 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1955); cf. May v. Anderson,

345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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